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This article was excerpted and
abridged with permission from a
chapter in Professor White's recent book
Acts of Hope: Creating Authority in
Literature, Law, and Politics. In the
book, he explores the nature of
authority in veriow cultural contexts.
Here he examines theJoint Opinion in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which
has been been attacked bothfrom the
right, on the grounds that it tried to
keep Roe v. Wade alive, andfrom the
left, on the grounds that it signqicantly
weakens the force of that case. Professor
White, by contrast, admires it greatly,
and in this chapter explains why.

01994 by the University of Chicago.
All nghts reserved. Reprinted with permission.

When the Supreme Court faces a
precedent it disagrees with, the authority
of the past becomes a real issue for us,
not merely a theoretical one, for we must
repeatedly ask to what weight the earlier
decision is entitled. Is the present Court
bound by a prior case, even if it thinks
the judgment wrong or undesirable?
Or is the prior case to be read simply as
advisory: Here is what some people have
thought, after putting their minds to the
question; you should take it seriously so
far as you respect the quality of their
work, but no more seriously than any
other thought on the subject by, say, a
professor or journalist or a politician?
On this view, precedent would simply be
another source of information about ways
to think about the case. Or is there a
different view?
I want to explore this matter in
connection with the abortion issue,
which raises it in a stark and public form.
One way to put the question is by asking
whether Roe v. Wade, the 1973 case
establishing a woman's constitutional
right to decide whether to continue a
pregnancy, should be regarded as
authoritative and hence binding on the
present Court, which, as I write in 1992,
has a large majority that apparently
would have voted the other way in Roe.

It is not simply that these justices
disapprove of abortion as a moral matter;
they believe that Roe represented a
serious misreading of the Constitution.
What attitude should they then have
towards Roe v. Wade? One cannot really
begin to think about this question
without thinking about the cases that
precede Roe, with an eye both to their
meaning and to their authority.

PRIOR LAW
As the Constitution was onginally
adopted, virtually no argument could
have been made that it prohibited the
states from adopting "anti-abortion"
laws The reason is that, w t h the exception of a small number of provlslons in
Articles I and IV, the Constitution did
not limlt the power of a state over ILS
citEens at all It was pnmarily meant to
allocate governmental power among
the three branches of the national
government and between the national
government on the one hand and the
states on the other The Bill of fights,
adopted in 1791, did not change this as

far as the states were concerned, for its
provisions and protections were limitations only on the federal government.
The states were free to violate them as
much as they wished, as indeed was
necessary if some of them were to
maintain the institition of human slavery.
Only after the Civil War was the
Constitution amended to regulate the
relation between the citizen and the state.
The method chosen was not, however,
simply to apply the Bill of Rights to the
states; rather, the new amendments
focused on the rights of the newly freed
slaves and other African Americans.
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited
slavery; the Fifteenth provided that the
vote should not be withheld on the
grounds of race; the Fourteenth, for our
purposes the most important one, spoke
in more general language, providing that
no state should deprive any person of
I "life, liberty, or property without due
process of law" or deny any person
"equal protection of the laws." What is
this lanpage to mean? In answering this
. question, the Supreme Court created a
jurisprudence deeply affecting many
aspects of the relation between the citizen
and the state.
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LOCHNER
At first, this jurisprudence was
fashioned by a conservative Court, hostile
to social legislation and in particular to
state laws regulating the economy. In a
case that has become symbolic of the era,
Lochner v. New York (1905), it struck
down New York laws that prohibited
bakers from working more than ten
hours a day or sixty hours a week, on the
grounds that this was an impermissible
interference with liberty of the workmen
to contract for their labor. Other welfare
laws were invalidated for similar reasons.
The idea of "due process" that these laws
were held to violate was substantive, not
merely procedural: however correct its
processes of lawmaking, the state could
not interfere with an economy working
by the principles of the market without a
clear need articulated on recognized
grounds.
This position of the Court, of course,
was gradually overturned. The legislative
program of the New Deal was based on
very different premises: that our
economy and society were partly made
by human beings, that they were properly subject to reform and transformation, and t h a ~the health of the economy
required a prosperous working class to
serve as its customers. Through changes

of mind and personnel, the Court came
to support legslation based on these
views, at the state and national levels
alike.
In the process, the authority of Loclzneland its kin was thoroughly repudiated,
the Court insisting that these decisions
represented an inappropriate form of
judicial legislation, involving the imposition of partisan political or economic
values on the legslatures to whom our
democratic system assigned authority for
resolving those questions. The Court's
task, it was said, was not to impose its
view of the economy or society but to
confine itself to interpreting the limitations found in the Constitution.

OLMSTEAD AND
GRISWOLD
During the 1920s, while the conservatives were still in power, the Court
decided a case of enormous significance
for the future developnlent of the law
relating to abortion, though at first glance
it would seem to have a wholly different
subject. This case, Olmstend v. United
States (1927), held that wiretapping by
federal officials was not a "search within
the meaning of that word in the Fourth

IT IS NOT
SIMPLY THE PAST
THAT DECIDES.
Amendment, defining the term, as
though it were obvious, in terms of a
physical invasion or trespass.' The main
significance of the case lay not in its
holding, however, but in the dissents of
Holmes and Brandeis, especially the
latter, who thought the majority's view
unduly narrow and technical.
Brandeis believed that the Constitution
should be regarded not simply as a set of
commands to be read in an unimagnative and literal way, but as a text meant to
govern our polity for generations; its
language should be read not restrictively
but generously, whether one speaks of
grants of power to legislatures or of
definitions of the rights of citizens.
A particular provision, such as the
regulation of "searches," should accordingly be read not only in light of the
particular lunds of abuse with which the
framers were familiar, and which animated the provision in the first place, but
in light of principles defining the abuse in
its more general form. For Brandeis the
basic principle of the amendment was the
protection of privacy. It was adopted not
to protect property, but to protect the
right of people to be let alone. When that
right is violated as effectively by technology unknown to the framers as it would
be by a physical search, it should be held
within the constitutional p r ~ h i b i t i o n . ~
In the 1950s and after, the Court
became activist once more, but in quite a
different way from the Lochner Court.
Again the "due process" and "equal
protection" language of the Fourteenth
Amendment was read expansively, but
this time mainly to protect not economic
rights but civil rights and liberties. To a

'

For an exiended discussion of this case, see my
Jristice as TI-anslation:An Essay in Cultural and
Legal CI-it~cism(Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1990),chapter 6.
For a proposed analysis of this case that is
neither so literal minded as the majority nor so
expansive as Brandeis, see Clark Cunningham,
"A Linguistic Analysis of 'Search' in the Fourth
amend men^: A Search for Common Sense,"
73 Iowa Law Review 541 (1988).

large extent the provisions of the Bill of
kghts were read into the due process
clause, or considered "incorporated" in it,
especially those that protected the
freedom of press and religion and those
that governed the rights of those suspected of crime. The most important
single case was Brown v. Board of Educntion (1954), holding state-enforced racial
segregation in public schools to be a
violation of the equal protection clause.
Much of this was opposed as shocking
judicial activism, the conversion of
neutral constitutional law into valuebased politics, but often by those who
would have supported Lochner, and
defended, often in self righteous terms,
by those who would have regarded
Loclzner as a low point of judicial irresponsibility, indeed as a subversion of the
constitutional process. Insofar as these
two sides were defined by their affiliation
with one Court or another, both of them
were presented with the same problem:
how to disapprove of Lochner without
also disapproving of the Warren Court,
or vice versa.
Another of the crucial cases of this era,
from the point of view of theory and
consequence alike, was Griswold v.
Connecticut (1965), which held unconstitutional a Connecticut law prohibiting
the use of birth control devices, even by
married couples. This was obviously, to
most of the Court, an undesirable, bad,
even "silly" law - but how was it
unconstitutional? Speaking for the
majority, Justice Douglas explicitly
refused to be guided by the analogy to
Lochizer, a case he loathed, but instead
looked to the Bill of kghts, most of
which had by now been incorporated in
the Fourteenth Amendment. None of
these provisions, it is true, spoke of birth
control or reproductive freedom, or of
privacy, but many of them, taken
together, could be seen to serve the
fundamental value of human privacy.
This is an extension of the kind of
reading Brandeis gave the Fourth
Amendment in Olmstend. To make up for
the want of helpful language, Douglas

spoke of "penumbras" formed by "emanations" from these provisions, for which
he was widely ridiculed.
Others, notably Justice Harlan, round
in the due process clause itself an
injunction to the Court to insist upon the
protection of those rights that have been
fundamental to our ~ o c i e t yTo
. ~ determine these, it is not enough to look
within the self, at one's own values; one
must look without, at our history and
culture. The Constitution chose to
protect these rights under such vague
language because in the nature of things
they cannot be spelled out more precisely. Their definition and elaboration is
entrusted to the Court because the way
the Court works -by the decision of
particular cases, carefully argued on both
sides; by the refusal to decide more than
is actually before it; by the resulting
particularity of the judgment, informed
as it is by the ways in which conflicting
values present themselves in real cases entitles it to a trust and an authority that
a more political or less disciplined branch
of government would not deserve.
Like Brandeis, Harlan rejected the idea
that the Constitution should be regarded
as simply speaking in plain English,
saylng just what it means, and for much
the same reason: that the Constitution is
meant to serve the highest purposes of
government and collective life and that
these cannot be reduced to a code.
Instead, the Court must accept responsibility for judgment, which for Harlan
means a responsibility to educate itself at
the hands of its own past. As Harlan sees
it, the extraordinary duty and privilege ol
the judge is to reconstitute this source of
authority in his own prose. The line
between self and world is in this way
blurred, as the mind of the judge is partly
made by the very material it transforms.
But this was only his view. There were
six judges in the majority in Gris~jold,
each of them writing a separate opinion,
on a different theoly, leaving the law, to
say the least, unsettled.

ROE
Such, in extremely reduced outline,
was the state ol affairs at the lime Roe v.
Wade was decided in 1973. As everyone
Iznows, this case held that a woman has
the right to terminate her pregnancy
during its early stages. But the opinion of
the Court, written by Justice Blackmun,
locused less on the nature of her right
than on the nature of the interes~sthat
the state asserted as the ground for
limiting it. In this, it was reminiscent of
Lochner itself, for the idea of both is that
state interference with individual freedoms is invalid unless based on good
reasons (expressed in terms of public
health, safety, and morals in Lochner, and
of,legitimate, substantial, or compelling
state interests in Roe).
In Roe the Court held that during the
first trimester, before the fetus quickened, the decision about abortion was
solely for the woman and her doctor.
After that the state had a sufficient
interest to justify regulation to protect the
woman's health, for now abortion
presented greater dangers to the woman
than childbirth did. In the third trimester, when the fetus became independently viable, the state could act to
prolect that future human life by prohibiting abortion, except in the case of
danger to the woman's life or health.
This opinion was widely criticized,
not only by those who simply opposed
abortion but on institutional grounds.
Roe was felt by many to be an unwarranted interference with the rights of the
people of the slates to decide such
questions for themselves through the
political process. While the Court can
invalidate state legislation that is inconsistent with the Constitution, here there
is no constitutional language justifying
such action - nothing about "abortion"
or "privacy" - and no earlier precedent
supporting it, except maybe G~iswold,
which was felt to be an unwarranted
piece of judicial activism, and one or two
cases building upon it. Nor is Roe
supported by the prior practice of the
states, which was nearly uniformly to

regard abortion as subject to their
prohibition or regulation, at least in
recent decades.
Finally - for some most importantly
- the form of the opinion was legislative
rather than judicial. It consisted not of
the decision of a particular case under
general constitutional standards, but the
decision of an abstract issue by the
articulation of a regulatory code of the
sort we normally associate with legislation. Whatever the Constitution may be
thought to say about the principles of
privacy or reproductive rights, it is
ludicrous to think that it speaks in terms
of trimesters. To make rules of this sort,
the argument goes, is peculiarly the task
of the legislature, because by their nature
such rules work as approximations that
rest on estimates of factual probability
which the legislature is in a far better
position than the judiciary to make. My
own judgment at the time, for what it is
worth, was that the Court was wrong as a
matter of constitutional law, though on
the underlying moral issue of abortion I
was unsure what was right.
More can of course be said about Roe,
but for our purposes this is enough to
suggest that the situation of the Court in
1992, faced with a challenge to that case,
was a complex and difficult one. Roc
established both a general principle, that
the right to control reproduction lay
within the right to privacy, and a set of
quasi-legislative rules, which may be
entitled to significantly less authority
than its central holding. And the status of
the principle itself can be questioned, to
say the least: the case was contro~~ersial
when it was decided, on institutional as
well as substantive grounds; it depended
on Gliswold, itself a case that many
people felt to be wrong in principle and
method alike. To what, then, should
authority be given in deciding Casey,
and why?

CASEY
On both substantive and procedural
grounds, Roe has been controversial from
the day it was decided. It was the object
of excoriation by the Republican party in
particular, with both Presidents Reagan
and Bush seeking to appoint justices who
would overrule it. Of those on the Roe
Court only Blackmun, who wrote the
opinion, and White and Rehnquist, who
dissented, were left on the Court at the
time of Casey. All but White had been
appointed by Republican presidents, four
of them by Reagan or Bush. In a series of
inconclusive cases, the Court had
avoided either reaffirming or overruling
Roe, though Rehnquist and Scalia
repeatedly called for its rejection.' Casey
presented the issue of Roe's continued
vitality not so much because its facts
required the judgment as because the
recent appointment of Clarence Thomas
was thought to give the overrulers the
majority they needed. It was widely
believed that the Court would face and
resolve it, but no one could confidently
predict how the Court would vote,
largely because it was uncertain what
Justices O'Connor and Souter would do.
The legislature in Cnsey did not
attempt to prohibit abortion entirely but
instead regulated it, with a series of
requirements: that the doctor give the
woman certain information about
abortion itself and about the availability
of adoption agencies and others who
would support a decision to carry the

His views are best expressed m his famous
opinion in an earlier stase or the Gnswold case,
Poc v. Ullman (1961).
See, [or example, \Vcbstti. v. Rcproductlve Health
Sci~~ices,
492 U. S. 490 (1989);T h o ~ n b u ~ V.~ g l ~
Anlelicnn Coliegr cfObstct17cii7i1~C G~nciologLsts,
476 U. S.747 (1956);Aki-on v. A ~ I - o Cer~tcrjoln
Rrl)roduclive Hcalth, 462 U. S.416 11983);hlclbsi\I. Roe,432 U S . 464 (1977);Planned Pni-enthood
ojCentrz11 Mo v. Dnnjorth, 428 U 5.52 (1976);
Doc 1,. Bolton, 410 U 5.179 (1973).

fetus to term; that minors obtain the
consent of their parents, except in certain
cases: that a woman wait twenty-four
hours after first coming to the clinic or
hospital before actually having the
abortion; and that a married woman
inform her husband of her plans to have
an abortion. It would have been possible
to determine the validity of the regulations, especially in their favor, without
addressing the underlying issue, whether
ROEwas still good law. But no one on the
Court favored that; all wanted to face the
central question.
There are two relatively easy ways to
think about it: that Roc was right and
therefore still is the law, and that it was
wrong, and therefore is not. Justice
Blackmun, and to some degree Stevens,
adopted the first approach, while Justices
Scalia and Rehnquist, with Thomas and
White voting with them, took the
second. Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and
Souter wrote an opinion that takes a
different approach, and one that is
remarkable in several respects. It was
jointly written and siLgned,a rare event in
the history of the Court.' It was largely
written, I think, by the justices themselves and not by their clerks. It was
without a single footnote. Most important, it addressed not just the "rightness"
or "wrongness" of Roe abstractly considered, but the kind of weight and respect
it should be accorded under the doctrine
of stare decisis, even by those who
disagree with it.

right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." Eisenstadt v. Bczird, 405 U.S.
438, at 453 [emphasis in original].
Our precedents "have respected the
private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter." Princc 11. Mnssachusetts, 321 U. 5.158, 166 (1944). These
matters, involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart
of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.

THE AUTHORITY
OF THE PAST

In Casey the Court reaffirms what it
calls the "essential holding" of Roe - that
prior to viability it is the woman alone
who should decide whether to terminate
the pregnancy. Other parts of the holding
This happened also in Cooper 11.Aaron, 358 U.S.
1 ( 1958) and Rcgents of the Uni\~crsit~r
of C a l ~ f o ~ n i a viewed as less essential are discarded: the
11. Bahhe, 438 U.S. 265 (19781.
idea that the state has no interest at all in
protecting the future of a fetus before
quickening, for example, and the rigd
trimester structure. Rather, for the
authors of the Joint Opinion, the critical
line is viability: prior to that point the
state may regulate abortion, but it may
not take away the woman's right to
choose nor may it subject that choice to
"undue burdens." In this way they

reaffirm the central core of Roe. But they , reluctant or joyless opinion; its writers
do so less because they personally agree
find in their understanding of their role
with Roe as an original proposition than , and situation under our Constitution a
because they believe that respect for the
way of thinking and talking about this
Court's own past requires it.
issue that, in my view at least, dignifies
In this they are not simply knuckling
both it and them. Indeed, it is partly
under to what they regard as an unavoidbecause they would not originally have
able command, as cogs in an authoritar- ' voted for Roc that the conception they
ian intellectual machine, but acting out
have both of themselves and of that case,
of a complex conception both of this case ' which leads them to affirm it, has such
and of the Court, which they strive in
force and gravity.
this opinion to make real and compreTo start with the merits of Roe, the
hensible to their audience. This is not a
authors describe this case in a way that
does not commit them to the view that,
taking everything into account, it was
"right" when decided; rather, they
explain why, on the merits, the case is
! entitled to a high degree of respect. They
a

I

define Roe, that is, not as an unjustified
or bizarre decision which they might be
entitled to disregard, but as an important
effort by the Court to speak to a crucial
issue that is entitled to real respect certainly not desening the derisory
sneers of the chief justice and of Justice
Scalia. Here is what they say:
Our law affords constitutional
protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education. Gal-cy tr.
Population Set-vices International, 43 1
U. S., at 685. Our cases recognize "the

This is idealistic language, and it
esposes its authors to the contempt of
those who cannot stand that way of
talking. However, it catches an essential
point: that for the state to prohibit
abortion is to take a position on an
essentially religious topic, the nature of
human life, which it is the aim of our
Constitution to leave in private hands.
Not that an anti-abortion law is a fullfledged establishment of religion in
violation of the First Amendment, but it
has overtones of that kind, for its effect is
to preclude an individual woman from
addressing this essentially religous issue
on her own. The effect of this in turn is
to dwarf or limit her capacity for matura-

THE COURT TURNS ITS MIND
TO THE WAY CITIZENS RESPOND
TO ITS DECISIONS, ESPECIALLY
T O THOSE THEY DISAGREE WITH.
tion and responsibility as a full human
being. On this view, it is natural to see
the issue as the Court frames it, not in
terms of a specific right to abortion but as
an aspect of the "liberty" explicitly
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The point of liberty, so conceived, is not
simply freedom from constraint, but the
creation of conditions in which the
possibilities for human life can be most
fully achieved.
To conceive of what a legislature
intrudes upon when it prohibits abortion
not as a "right" but as an aspect of
"liberty" not only ties the holding more
firmly to the language of the Constitution, but it connects its two aspects, the
affirmance of Roe on the merits and the
institutional obligation to protect the
liberties defined by the Constitution, in a
consistent and coherent way. As the first
sentence of the opinion, in a sense
organizing the whole, puts it: "Liberty
finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt." This sentence calls on the Court
to determine whether liberty includes a
woman's right to make her own decisions
with respect to abortion, not in the
abstract, as if the issue were wholly new,
but in light of their obligation as a Court
to presei-ve the liberties established by
prior decisions.
This in turn calls for a process of
"reasoned judgment," a phrase that the
Court will define for us in the rest of
what it says. What it tells us now, in the
first sentence, is that it will not proceed
in the quasiscientific manner that
characterizes so much legal analysis, as
though the issues before it could be
separated into wholly discrete entities,
but with the acknowledgment that for
them the judgment on Roe is necessarily
at the same time a judgment about the
authority of the past. These issues are
interdependent; the Court thus establishes a mode of proceeding that is
comprehensive and integrative in character, rather than linear and abstract.

educated by engagement with the past.
The Court's term for this is "reasoned
For the writers of the Joint Opinion,
judgment." The idea of tradition with
the central modem text is not the
which Justice Harlan works is not as a set
majority opinion in Grisvvold, upon which of discrete decisions that are entitled to
Roe is usually thought to depend, but
authority, but as a process of developHarlan's earlier opinion in Poe v. Ullman
ment and change, to which it is the
(1961),in which he urged that the Court judge's task to contribute in an intelligent
strike down the same Connecticut
and responsible way. In invoking the
statute. This opinion is perhaps the
shade of Harlan as their guide, the
classic definition of a certain view of "due writers of the Joint Opinion ask to be
process": Harlan refused to reduce it to a
tested by his standards of intelligence,
code or to specific rules or practices of
responsibility, and humility. What sort of
the past - for the essence of liberty
education in the law, and our own
cannot be protected that way -yet at
traditions, does this text reflect? What
the same time refused to see it simply as
sort of education does it offer its reader?
the imposition of contemporary or
They begin by describing the kind of
evolving political values. The task of the
"liberty" that the abortion laws invade,
judge, as Harlan defined it, is to engage
but in so doing they are careful not to
with the traditions of the law and of our
speak as though it could be abstracted
country in a responsive and responsible
from the context in which they in fact
way; to defer in all reasonable ways to the face it - the context defined by the
judgments of others; to educate, and thus existence of Roe itself. It is not the case
transform, his own mind by full considfor them, as it is for more abstract
eration of what others have said and
thinkers, that legal questions should be
done; and, in a case which calls for it, to
decided as questions of theory, out of
make his judgment whether the state has time and place as it were, but the oppointerfered with a liberty defined by that
site of that: the case before them cannot
tradition. He sees that an essential part of be separated into the "merits of Roe" and
the tradition lies in its principles of selfthe "obligation to follow the law." Both
transformation. Conservation requires
aspects are before them, and they
change.
interact: "The reservations any of us may
The very fact that the power the
have in reaffirming the central holding of
Constitution has given the Court cannot
Roe are outweighed by the explication of
be reduced to rules, but rests on prinindividual liberty we have given comciples and understandings necessarily
bined with the force of stare decisis." This
broad and indeterminate, means that
insistence upon the actual context and
great restraint is essential to its exercise
upon the interrelatedness of the decisions
and continued existence. Such power will before them, like their earlier invocation
be tolerated in unelected officials only
of Justice Harlan at his greatest, enacts a
when used sparingly and well. Likewise,
kind of conservatism very different from
the act of judgment must be reasoned,
radical dogmatism of our era. It is a
and in this sense justify itself: it is not
cultural conservatism, of which an
simply the past that decides, as if you
important element is the location of
could take any modem issue and see how authority outside one's own dispositions,
others dealt with it, nor simply the
and outside one's own ratiocinations, in
present, as if the meaning of the case
the culture, as this is reconstituted by an
could adequately be cast in terms of
attentive mind.
contemporary political debate. The task
of the judge is to educate himself, to
modify his own sensibilities by engagement with our tradition, so that in the
end it is neither he alone, nor the past
alone, that decides, but he as formed and

LIBERTY

STARE DECISIS
Their explicit discussion or stare
dccisis, to which (hey next turn, proceeds
lrom the double assumption that some
obligaiion to follow ihe past is necessary
both to the idea of law and to the
legitimacy of the Court, yet thai the past
cannot be followed slavishly. The Court
thus explicitly resists the temptation to
collapse a complicated inquiry into a
slogan, but recognizes that the twin
necessities they describe define a field for
what they have called "reasoned judgment" which ihey will now undertake to
exemplify.
They begin their performance by
looking to the other cases in which the
Court has been faced with the issue of
stare decisis. In considering the degree of
authority to be given the past, that is,
they proceed by first considering the past
itself. What they claim to discover is that
this judgment has been guided by several
factors: whether the case in question has
proved unworkable; whether its continuance is supported by reliance that would
make its overruling especially burdensome or inequitable; whether doctrine in
related fields has developed to such a
degree t h a ~the case in question is merely
a "remnant" of an abandoned view; and
whether the factual perceptions that
supported the original decision have
changed in such a way as to undermine
il. Aslzing of Roe the questions these
criteria suggest, they not unsurprisingly
find that it has not proven unworkable,
hat doc~rinehas not developed in such a
way as to leave it behind - quite the
reverse in fact - and that while the
[actual context has changed owing to
medical advances, it has done so in ways
ha^ affect only the trimester scheme of
Roe, not its essential holding.

With respect to reliance, their argument is more complex, difficult, and
important. First, they acknowledge that
this is not a case in which people have
advanced sums of money in reliance
upon a rule of property or contract in
such a way as to make it unfair to change
it on them. But this should not exhaust
the meaning of reliance:
To eliminate the issue of reliance
that easily, however, one would need
to limit cognizable reliance to specific
instances of sexual activity. But to do
this would be simply to refuse to face
the fact that for two decades of
economic and social developments,
people have organized intimate
relationships and made choices that
define their views of themselves and
their places in society, in reliance on
the availability of abortion in the event
that contraception should fail. The
ability of women to participate equally
in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their
ability to control their repl-oductive
lives. See, e.g., R. Petchesky, Abortion
and Woman's Choice 109, 133, n. 7
(rev. ed. 1990). The Constitution
serves human values, and while the
effect of reliance on Roe cannot be
exactly measured, neither can the
certain cost of overruling Roe for
people who have ordered their
thinking and living around that case
be dismissed.
This passage connects the issue of
reliance, which bears on the issue of stare
decisis, with a larger sense of the nature
and importance of a judicial decision of
this character. Such an opinion becomes
a part of the culture, they say: it affects
ihe ways in which people conceive of
themselves and their possibilities for life.
Insofar as it is not to be repudiated on
one of the grounds suggested, this is a
large and deep reason for its continua n ~ eIn. ~Burke's terms, the significant
decisions of the Supreme Court help
shape our "prejudices," the attitudes and
feelings, the ways of imagining our world
and affiliating ourselves with it, that
makes us what we are.

OVERRULINGS
The Court could stop here, but it goes
on to consider the two instances of
overruling that cut most powerfully
against what it has said: the rejection of
Lochner in the 1930s and the repudiation
of the "separate but equal" doctrine in
Brown v. Board of Education.
With respect to the Lochner tradition,
the key case was West Coast Hotel v .
Parish (1937), overruling Adhins v.
Clzildren's Hospital of D. C. (1923), which
had struck down a statute requiring
employers to pay adult women a minimum wage. This case was properly
overruled, the Court says, and on the
grounds that do not reach Roe, for
Adkins unlike Roe rested on "fundamentally false factual assumptions about the
capacity of a relatix~elyunregulated
market to satisfy minimum levels of
human welfare." Even if one does not
oneself believe these assumptions false,
that does not blunt the force of the
Court's point: to the overruling Court in
West Coast Hotel the assumptions were
plainly false in a way for which there is
no analogue in Roe.
Assimilating B P O I Yto~ the model of
West Coast Hotel, the Court in Casey
focuses on language in Plessy v. Ferpson
(1896) which denies, as a factual matter,
that the mere separation of the races, in
this case on trains, stamps one race with
inferiority. Admitting that the justices
may not in fact have believed this How could they! - the Court says that it
is nonetheless the "stated justification"
for their opinion, and by the time of
Brown this factual assumption was seen
as plainly wrong.
In a final section of its opinion, before
reaching the particular provisions of the
Pennsylvania statute before it, the Court
expands on what it thinks is at stake in
its decision: the legitimacy of the Court
" Compare the famous remark of Brancleis in
Oltnstcnd v. United Stales, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(19271, that "the Govemn~entis the potent.
the omnipresent teacher."

itself, and its capacity to perform its
essential and unique role in our democracy. To discharge its responsibilities and
maintain its position, the Court must
seelz to decide cases on the ground of
principle, or what it earlier called
"reasoned judgment." "The Court must
take care to speak and act in ways that
allow people to accept its decisions on
the terms the Court claims for them, as
grounded truly in principle, not as
compromises with social and political
pressures having, as such, no bearing on
the principled choices that the Court is
obliged to make." Essential to this goal is
respect for the decisions of the past;
frequent overruling of its own decisions
would be a statement by the Court itself
that they were not entitled to respect.
Where, as here, the Court decides a
matter intensely divisive ol our polity, it
is especially important to respect the
choices that have been made by the past.
"Only the most convincing justifications"
could demonstrate that an overruling in
such a case was "anything but a surrender to political pressure." Once the
decision is made, it is essential to live
with it unless it is plainly wrong. This is
the point where the Court comes closest
to acknowledging the existence of the
enonnous forces at work in our country
on abortion, making it a focus of opposition that has some of the characteristics
of a civil war itself. The extraordinary
character of the issue makes principled
judgment and adherence to prior authority all the more important. To reverse
oneself under pressure will give the
impression, perhaps correctly, that the
Court is nothing but another vehicle for
political life - and that (though they do
not say this) the appointment of new
justices can properly rest on purely
political and result-oriented judgments
rather than on qualities of mind and
character traditionally thought essential
to the judicial role.

There follows now an extraordinary
moment in the histoi-)~of American law.
The Court turns its mind to the way
citizens respond to its decisions, especially to those they disagree with. Of
course it is easy to support the Court
when it comes out your way, and of
course many people who disagree
respond with simple and continuing
opposition or resistance. It is not with
either of these groups that the Court
concerns itself, but with those who ,
disagree with the result, yet "struggle to
accept it, because they respect the rule of
law." To them the Court must keep its
promise; for if it does not, but reverses
itself too easily, in the end "a price [.cvill]
be paid for nothing."
The Court does not explicate this
point further, but what they mean,
I think, is this: they are imagining the
moral drama that occurs when a person
is opposed to a law yet respects it,
a drama in ordinary life that parallels the
one they are experiencing as judges. This
drama is seen as a painful but also as a
good thing. It is good because only at
such moments is the commitment to the
rule of law a meaningful one: when you
agree with the law, there is no problem;
when you resist and oppose, you are
refusing to accord the law respect. Only
when you disagree on an important
matter are you given the opportunity to
engage in the moral practice of respecting
it. Such a moment is a stage in the
development of an essential ingredient of
civic character; it is a part of an education, not purely practical or intellectual
or a matter of training but an education
of the whole self. In this it would be
recognizable by Plato and Aristotle, both
of whom saw education as the development of the character through testing and
the development of habit. A person who
has been through the struggle the Court
describes will know, as no one else really
can, the importance of the rule of law
itself; and having respected it against his
own inclination, he will be in a position
to insist that others respect it against
theirs.

On such a view of civic life in general,
and of the activity of the Court as well,
the Court is resisting many tendencies of
our culture: the attitude stimulatecl by
our consumer economy, and given
theoretical standing by certain schools ol
economics, that reduces all chdices to
preferences and treats them all as equal;
the comparable view in the political
arena that democracy means the collective preference of the majority, however
uneducated or biased it may be; the way
in which certain political candidates
address the voting public by trylng to
stimulate whatever feelings will move it
to vote for them, often in impossibly
simplistic language, and the view that the
Court is really just another political
agency, to be staffed by those who will
carry out the president's political agenda,
and that all its opinions are really just the
rationalization of the exercise of power.
The Joint Opinion resists all of those
assumptions, seeing in the citizen a
capacity for responsible tension and
growth, and seeing in the process or law
- especially in the work of the Court a source of education for itself and the
polity. It defines the life of the citizen as
an ethical drama, and its own life as one,
too, providing a basis on which one can
find possibilities for meaning in our
shared life that are worthy of humanity.
So read, this opinion enhances the
dignity of the Court and the nation alike.
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